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Abstract—The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial attacks has been widely demonstrated (e.g., adversarial example
attacks). Traditional attacks perform unstructured pixel-wise perturbation to fool the classifier. An alternative approach is to have
perturbations in the latent space. However, such perturbations are hard to control due to the lack of interpretability and
disentanglement. In this paper, we propose a more practical adversarial attack by designing structured perturbation with semantic
meanings. Our proposed technique manipulates the semantic attributes of images via the disentangled latent codes. The intuition
behind our technique is that images in similar domains have some commonly shared but theme-independent semantic attributes, e.g.
thickness of lines in handwritten digits, that can be bidirectionally mapped to disentangled latent codes. We generate adversarial
perturbation by manipulating a single or a combination of these latent codes and propose two unsupervised semantic manipulation
approaches: vector-based disentangled representation and feature map-based disentangled representation, in terms of the complexity
of the latent codes and smoothness of the reconstructed images. We conduct extensive experimental evaluations on real-world image
data to demonstrate the power of our attacks for black-box classifiers. We further demonstrate the existence of a universal,
image-agnostic semantic adversarial example.
Index Terms—Adversarial examples, neural networks, feature manipulation, variational autoencoder, latent representation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The existence of adversarial examples causes serious se-
curity concerns about the reliability of deep neural networks
(DNNs). In these adversarial examples, small perturbations
that are hard for humans to recognize are intentionally
added to the original inputs to cause a DNN to mislabel the
perturbed inputs with high confidence [1], [2]. Most existing
adversarial attacks are performed by adding unstructured
perturbations only in the pixel-wise input space to fool the
classifier. Such perturbations are often unnatural, not se-
mantically meaningful and can easily be detected since they
are distinctly identified in the latent space (far from the man-
ifold of normal instances). Some recent works attempted
to perturb the latent space, to obtain natural adversarial
examples, e.g. [3]. However, due to lack of interpretability
and disentanglement
Recent developments in variational autoencoder (VAE)
[4]-based representation learning, e.g., β-VAE [5], Factor-
VAE [6], have resulted in significant advancements in the
fields of disentanglement learning. These approaches pro-
vide an interpretable way to understand and control high
dimensional data samples in terms of a low dimensional set
of latent representations. Also known as disentanglement,
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this is a representation where a change in one dimension
corresponds to a change in one factor of variation while
being relatively invariant to changes in other factors [7].
Consequently, it is feasible to conduct a new adversarial
attack by manipulating disentangled latent representations
(also called latent codes). Latent codes consist of a latent
vector or a set of latent feature maps.
In this paper, we introduce a systematic framework to
generate structured perturbation with semantic meanings
to produce semantic adversarial examples with the smooth
and natural visual transition while efficiently causing mis-
classification, by semantically connecting the disentangled
latent space and the pixel input space. Demonstration is
given in Section 4.6 Attack Demonstration. We assume that
the images in similar domains have some commonly shared
but theme-independent semantic attributes, e.g. thickness
of lines in handwritten digits, that can be bidirectionally
mapped to disentangled latent codes. We generate adver-
sarial perturbation by manipulating a single or a combina-
tion of these latent codes, in an interpretable, smooth and
stealthy manner. For example, we find a latent code that
only controls the thickness of handwritten digits then we
add perturbation to the corresponding factor encoded from
a digit 7 to manipulate the thickness. This fools the classifier
to misrecognize the perturbed digit as 1. Taking the face
recognition as another example, the adversary can perform a
semantic adversarial attack by identifying the disentangled
latent code to reveal smiling facial expressions only. This
could fool a face classifier to make the wrong prediction by
conducting linear interpolation on the latent feature map to
change a normal face with a smiling facial expression. The
change of the adversarial example should be natural and
smooth for humans.
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2In this work, we present generated adversaries to
demonstrate the potential of the semantic adversarial attack
for black-box classifiers, with the existence of an image-
agnostic adversarial example. The main contributions of this
work are summarized as follows:
(1) To obtain latent representation that can easily be
manipulated in a human-cognition manner, we propose a
common feature variational autoencoder (CF-VAE), with
better disentanglement performance. CF-VAE is trained to
obtain bidirectional mapping between the high-dimensional
data samples x and the low-dimensional latent represen-
tation z (also called latent codes) that are disentangled
and with semantic meaning. To achieve a better disentan-
glement, the CF-VAE divides the latent codes into theme-
independent codes and theme-relevant codes. In addition,
a Total Correlation term is used to improve independence
in the distribution of latent code z to further improve
disentanglement performance.
(2) To balance the trade-off and improve reconstruction
quality, we propose a generative adversarial network-based
booster (GAN-B) to learn a more accurate projection of map-
ping latent code to the pixel-wise domain. This is necessary
since the utility of the reconstructed sample by the decoder
is generally limited and blurry as a result of the trade-off
between reconstruction and disentanglement. The feature-
wise similarity is applied to transfer representation from
pre-trained GAN (generative adversarial network) to the
CF-VAE for reconstructing high-quality instances. Namely,
the latent representation of a single layer l from the discrim-
inator of GAN (trained on clean instances) is used as the
reconstructed error evaluation for CF-VAE.
(3) We perturb the theme-independent codes to recon-
struct an adversarial example that causes misclassification.It
aims to find the optimal perturbation added to the specific
factor of the latent code in a semantics-legible manner while
ensuring the stealthiness of malicious perturbation in both a
visual perspective and latent space so that it can defeat the
latent detection-based defenses. The attack-effective value
range for perturbation design that can effectively give rise
to misclassification for a specific (or a combination) latent
code is also recognized.
(4) We enhance the semantic adversarial attack against
images with complex semantic attributes, e.g., face images,
combining the CF-VAE with image-to-image translation. To
obtain a better smoothness of perturbed images by recon-
struction, we jointly train two CF-VAEs to obtain theme-
independent latent codes, i.e. a set of feature maps, for
semantic manipulation.
We conduct extensive experimental evaluations on the
real-world image data to demonstrate the power of our
attack for black-box classifiers and present a comprehensive
empirical analysis of the possible factors that affect the
attack. Our experiments reveal potential security breaches
where adversaries can control the semantic features to break
a classifier and demonstrate that semantic-based perturba-
tion is more practical than pixel-wise manipulation. We also
empirically investigate the universal semantic adversarial
examples also exist.
The next section describes the preliminary concepts and
the background on adversarial examples. Sections III and
IV explain the system design and our approach. Section
V describes our experimental results. Section VI discusses
related work, and Section VII concludes the work as a
whole.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Adversarial Examples
For a given input sample x, the adversarial example [8]
is a sample x′ that is similar to x (according to particular
measure metrics) but so that the decision of the classifier F
F(x) 6= F(x′) [9]. A classifier can misclassify an adversarial
example for two reasons. (1) The adversarial example is
far from the boundary of the manifold of the task. For
example, the task is a handwritten digit classification, and
the adversarial example is an image containing no digit,
but the classifier has no option to reject this example and is
forced to output a class label. (2) The adversarial example is
close to the boundary of the manifold. If the classifier poorly
generalizes the manifold in the vicinity of the adversarial
example, then misclassification occurs.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Networks
The typical GAN architecture contains two neural networks:
one generator neural network G, trained to generate a sam-
ple from a set of random numbers, and one discriminator
D, trained to categorize data as real or fake. As the GAN
networks are trained, G learns to generate samples that
can fool D. Let pz(z) be the input noise distribution of G
and pdata(x) be the real data distribution, the purpose of
GANs is to train G and D to play the following two-player
minimax game with value function V (G,D):
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) = Ex v pdata(x)[logD(x)]+
Ez v pdata(x)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(1)
GAN can be applied in varied unsupervised and semi-
supervised learning tasks [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
2.3 Autoencoders and β-VAE
Autoencoders (AEs) are common deep models in unsuper-
vised learning [7]. They aim to represent high-dimensional
data through the low-dimensional latent layer, a.k.a. bottle-
neck vector or code. Architecturally, Basically, an encoder
E, parameterized by qφ(z|x), is trained to convert high-
dimensional data x into the latent representation bottleneck
vector z in latent space that follows a specific Gaussian
distribution p(z) ∼ N(0, 1). The decoder pθ(x|z) is trained
to reconstruct the latent vector z to x. The training process
of the autoencoders is to minimize the reconstruction error.
Formally, we can define the encoder and the decoder as
transitions τ1 and τ2:
τ1(X)→ Z, τ2(Z)→ Xˆ, τ1, τ2 = argmin
τ1,τ2
∥∥∥X − Xˆ∥∥∥2 (2)
The VAEs model [4] shares the same structure with the
autoencoders but is based on an assumption that the latent
variables follow some kind of distribution, such as Gaussian
or uniform distribution. It uses variational inference for
the learning of the latent variables. In VAEs the hypoth-
esis is that the data is generated by a directed graphical
3model p(x|z) and the encoder is to learn an approximation
qφ(z|x) to the posterior distribution pθ(z|x) estimated by
the decoder. The encoder and decoder are trained simulta-
neously based on the negative reconstruction error and the
regularization term, i.e., Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
between qφ(z|x) and p(z), by optimizing the variational
lower bound:
L(θ, φ;x) = KL(qφ(z|x)||p(z))−Eqφ(z|x)[logpθ(x|z)] (3)
The left part is the KL divergence regularization term to
match the posterior of z conditional on x, i.e., qφ(z|x), to
a target distribution p(z), e.g., Gaussian distribution whose
mean µ and diagonal covariance
∑
are the encoder output.
The right part denotes the reconstruction loss for a spe-
cific sample x. In a training batch, the loss can be averaged
as:
LV AE = Epdata(x)[L(θ, φ;x)]
= Epdata(x)[KL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(z))]− Epdata(x)[Eqφ(z|x)[logpθ(x|z)]]
(4)
β-VAE [5] is a modification of the VAE framework that
introduces an adjustable hyperparameter β to the original
VAE objective:
L = Eqφ(logpθ(x|z))− βDKL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(z)) (5)
Well chosen values of β (usually β > 1) result in more
disentangled latent representations z. Therefore, there exists
a value of β > 1 that gives the highest disentanglement but
results in a higher reconstruction error than a VAE.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 Semantic Adversarial Example
Unlike the notion of the adversarial example introduced in
Section 2 , the semantic adversarial example can be defined
and formalized as follows.
Let D denote the set of examples in the sample space.
Let F(x) denote a pre-trained classifier, which outputs the
final prediction label y = F(x). Let S denote the set of
underlying semantic features, interpreted as the representa-
tion of the data by human cognition. For example, s1 ∈ S
is the color of skin and s2 ∈ S is the length of hair for
a given human face image. We assume that observations
x ∈ D can be generated by combining M primary dis-
entangled latent factors So = (s1, · · · , sM ), si ∈ S, and
Sc = (s1, · · · , sK), si ∈ So is the set of K commonly
shared or theme-independent features across classes, e.g.
the thickness of handwritten digits or facial express of
face images. Unlike most existing adversarial examples that
directly add unstructured pixel-wise perturbation in the
input space or random latent representation of z space,
our adversary A aims at perturbing a fraction of disen-
tangled latent representations derived from a sample x to
generate structured perturbations with semantic meaning,
e.g. changing the thickness of digits or the facial expres-
sion of face images. Such semantic perturbation is named
semantic feature manipulation, which is achieved by (1)
learning a latent code that can reveal the commonly shared
or theme-independent features across classes, e.g., via VAE-
based disentangled learning; (2) perturbing latent codes to
reconstruct an adversarial example that can fool a targeted
classifier in an interpretable, natural and smooth manner.
Formally, let E(x) be an encoder that can map x to
latent codes −→z , namely E(x) → −→z = {z1, · · · , zM}, in
which zi reveals a specific semantic feature si and zi follow
the distribution Pz . −→z can be inversed back to x∗ with
the help of a decoder D(−→z ) → x∗. The perturbation of
latent codes is to add random noise ∆z to the values of
the latent codes, assuming zi for simplicity. ∆z is from the
same distribution Pz as z. The goal of A is to design per-
turbation ∆z for zi to fool the pre-trained classifier f such
that F(x∗) 6= y, D(E(x) = {z1, · · · , zi + ∆z, · · · }) → x∗
while ∆z to be imperceptible and x∗ to be as similar as x
(according to particular smoothness metrics).
The adversarial image x∗ for x can be designed by
satisfying the three objectives given as follows, with respect
to the reconstructed image based on the perturbed latent
codes.
x∗ = D(E(x) = {z1, · · · , zi + ∆z∗, · · · }),
s.t. F(x∗) 6= y and ||∆z∗|| ≤ ,
∆z∗ = argmin||∆z||,
and similarity(x∗, x) ≥ θSIM
(6)
The universal definition of the semantic adversarial
example is defined as follows: Let Dy denote the set of
examples with the same label y, the perturbation ∆z, added
in a specific latent factor zi on a x ∈ Dy to make misclassifi-
cation, can also cause misclassification on a number of other
x′ ∈ Dy . The fraction of the affected instance is referred to as
the fooling rate (FR). Namely, for the universal adversarial
semantic adversarial example, not only the above equation
should be satisfied but the fooling rate should also be more
than a threshold FRD
y
∆z∗ ≥ θFR.
3.2 Adversary Model
We characterize an adversary according to its goals and
knowledge regarding the learning model and training data.
3.2.1 Goals
To launch an effective and successful semantic adversarial
attack, the following goals of the adversary should be satis-
fied.
(G1) Efficient perturbation to fool target classifier (term
1 in Eq. 6). A successful attack must have a high and consis-
tent success rate (SR). The adversarial perturbation should
be sufficiently reliable that a given perturbed instance is
classified with high accuracy to the wrong label. A non-
targeted misclassification attack is explored in this work. To
ensure the consistent nature of the SR, the proportion of
satisfactory perturbations that give rise to misclassification
in high probability, within an interpolation value range
[low, high], a.k.a efficient ratio ER, should be more than
a threshold θER.;
(G2) Stealthy perturbation. It is desirable that the adver-
sarial perturbation is stealthy so that it is hard to detect and
should be visually imperceptible both in input space and
latent space, even under the examination of a machine de-
tector. Invisible perturbation should be added in the latent
code so that the perturbed instance is close to the manifold
of normal data in latent space (invisible/imperceptible, term
2 in Eq. 6), namely |∆z∗i |p ≤ .
4(G3) The perturbed instance has a high level of semantic
similarity with the original instance, i.e., the change of the
instance in the input space is considered as natural and
smooth to the human eye (stealthiness, term 3 in Eq. 6),
namely Similarity(x∗, x) ≥ θSIM ;
(G4) Perturbation should be as universal as possible,
i.e., a single perturbation ∆z∗ can affect multiple instances,
namely, the fooling rate should be more than θFR. It is
desirable that the adversarial perturbation is universal so
that it is easy to design an effective perturbation for a large
database without time and resource overheads.
3.2.2 Knowledge
In contrast to the minimal knowledge assumption that
the adversary has known neither the training data nor
the specifics of the learning model, we relax some of the
assumptions related to the attacker’s knowledge. Here, we
assume that the adversary has no knowledge of the model
architecture, i.e., black-box classifier, but has access to the
training data, or either can know the type of training data
the targeted classifier used, e.g., human face data or can
obtain some very relevant data.
4 FRAMEWORK FOR GENERATING SEMANTIC AD-
VERSARIAL EXAMPLE
In this paper, we propose a semantic adversarial attack
scheme that is interpretable, smooth and universal. In this
section, we describe the two approaches of our attack
scheme: Vector-based Semantic Manipulation and Feature Map-
based Semantic Manipulation, and its three main components,
Learning Disentangled Representations, GAN-Based Booster and
Invisible Latent Perturbation.
4.1 Attack Overview
Our attack scheme aims to generate interpretable and uni-
versal semantic adversarial examples with invisible pertur-
bation by manipulating some commonly shared or theme-
independent features. Ideally, we can learn a disentan-
gled latent code vector that can be used to reconstruct
images and one factor of the vector affects one semantic
feature only, via solely conducting naive common feature
variational autoencoder(CF-VAE).This may work well for
simple images (e.g. handwriting digits), as the diversity
and dimension of the feature are simple and most of the
essential features can be captured via a 20-dimensional
vector. However, the quality of the reconstructed image
is significantly affected by the diversity and dimension of
the feature retained by the latent codes, as well as the
trade-offs between the disentanglement performance and
the reconstruction quality. The performance on the complex
images (e.g. face) is not as good as the simple images (e.g.
handwriting digits) when only conducting onefold CF-VAE,
since the feature dimension of the face is very large, and it
is hard to leverage a low-dimensional latent code vector to
generate a natural and smooth perturbed image.
Therefore, we apply two semantic manipulation ap-
proaches to generate adversarial instances in terms of the
feasibility of semantic manipulation: Vector-based Semantic
Manipulation via Onefold CF-VAE and Feature Map-based Se-
mantic Manipulation via Multiple CF-VAE. The advantage of
the onefold approach is the unsupervised manner and that
no corresponding image pairs are required. The advantage
of the multiple approaches is the precise constraint on
reconstituted images to achieve better quality.
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Fig. 1. The vector-based semantic manipulation scheme via onefold CF-
VAE (left) and feature map-based semantic manipulation scheme via
multiple CF-VAEs (right). The loss function of the CF-VAE combines
LK , LR LT and LE . DTC (Discriminator for TC estimation) is trained
to estimate the TC value, C is trained to strip class-unique features and
DG (Discriminator of GAN) improves the reconstruction error evaluation.
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Fig. 2. The semantic adversarial example perturbation scheme. Given
an instance x, semantic adversarial attack generates adversaries by
perturbing disentangled latent factor(s) and decoding the perturbation’s
latent bottleneck vector to fool the pre-trained classifier Cpre.
Vector-based Semantic Manipulation via Onefold CF-VAE.
This can be implemented by a sole CF-VAE based repre-
sentation learning, as shown in Fig.1 left, trained on clean
training samples to obtain disentangled and independent la-
tent representations that are easy to control and understand
by humans. To improve the disentanglement performance,
a discriminator is trained for Total Correlation (TC) [15]
estimation (DTC) to improve the independence of latent
representations for CF-VAE. In addition, a classifier C is
trained to filter class-unique information and only retain the
common features to further improve the disentanglement
performance. To improve the reconstruction quality, a gener-
ative adversarial network-based booster (GAN-B) is trained
on clean training instances, which provides a discriminator
DG to improve the reconstruction error evaluation so that it
enhances the quality of reconstructed instances. Finally, an
invisible latent perturbation by stochastic searching is used
to seek perturbation z′i = zi+∆z for a specific disentangled
latent factor zi (or a group), to achieve the adversarial
goals, as shown in Fig. 2. Details of each component will
be introduced in the following sections.
Feature Map-based Semantic Manipulation via multiple CF-
VAE. For the complex images, we apply an unsupervised
image-to-image translation, e.g. UNIT or MUNIT [16], [17],
5to learn the theme-independent latent codes for seman-
tic manipulation. We learn the desired semantic attribute-
conditional transition from well-labeled natural images, e.g.
CelebA [18] or RaFD dataset, for semantic manipulation. For
instance, a set of smiley face images can be considered as a
smile domain, the semantic transition from a natural face
to smile can be conducted by learning a joint distribution
of images in source and targeted (smile) domains. In this
scenario, we assume that for any given pair of correspond-
ing images (xs, xt) in source and targeted domains, Xs
and Xt, can be mapped to the same latent representation
in commonly shared latent codes z [16]. Here, the code
is a set of feature maps, i.e. blocks of a feature matrix.
Namely, both images can be recovered from this code, and
we can compute this code from each of the two images.
To achieve this goal, we jointly train two CF-VAEs on the
source images Xs (to attack) and target image Xt (to change
for, e.g., smile face images), as two domains, as shown in
Fig. 1 right. Consequently, we can use Dt(zs ∼ qs(zs|xs))
to translate images from Xs to Xt by assembling a subset
of the subnetworks. GAN-B can be also incorporated into
the image-to-image transition to improve the quality of the
reconstructed images. The latent code’s iteratively stochastic
searching is applied to generate adversarial examples by
perturbing the shared latent codes (a set of the matrix) that
control the desired semantic attributes.
4.2 Vector-based Semantic Manipulation via onefold
CF-VAE
For images with a small number of semantic attributes, a
low-dimensional latent code vector, learned by a onefold
VAE-based disentanglement learning, can maintain most
of the significant features of images. Then, it is desired to
obtain better disentangled and theme-independent latent
codes, which will be used to design smooth and natural
adversarial examples via semantic manipulation-based per-
turbation. Consequently, we propose CF-VAE, derived from
VAE. It is incorporated with a classifier on top of the latent
code to achieve disentanglement in the latent codes z that
follow a fixed prior distribution while being unrelated to
the label, i.e. to extract class irrelevant z. Furthermore, Total
Correlation (TC) [15] is applied to promote the latent factors
to be more independent, to improve the disentanglement
performance.
4.2.1 Disentangled theme-independent code learning
To obtain theme-irrelevance for good disentanglement in z,
we apply the irrelevance term LE , estimated by a classifier
parameterized by ς on the latent codes z, derived from the
encoder qφ(z|x), to classify the label of z. The adversarial
learning approach, similar to [19], is used to train the classi-
fier. The adversarial classifier is added after z to distinguish
its label, while the encoder tries to fool it, as demonstrated
in Fig. 1 left. The objective of the classifier can be defined as
cross-entropy loss:
LC = −Eqφ(z|x)
∑
c
I(c = y)log qς(c|z) (7)
Here I(c = y) is the indicator function, and qς(c|z)
is softmax probability output of the classifier. Simply, we
assume the labels are distributed uniformly across all in-
puts, i.e. class probabilities pi = 1/C . To peel the effect of
labels and to extract class irrelevant z, the encoder qφ(z|x) is
simultaneously trained to fool the classifier with loss added
by a cross entropy loss defined as follows:
LE = Eqφ(z|x)
∑
c
1
C
log qς(c|z) (8)
4.2.2 Disentanglement improvement by inner-
independence
To obtain inner independence for good disentanglement in
z, Total Correlation (TC) [15] is used to encourage indepen-
dence in the latent vector z, formally
TC(z) = KL(q(z)||q¯(z)) = Eq(z)[log q(z)
q¯(z)
] (9)
As TC is hard to obtain, the approximate tricks used in
[6] is applied to estimate TC. Specifically, a discriminator
DTC is applied to output an estimate of the probability D(z)
whose input is a sample from q(z) rather than from q¯(z) to
classify between samples from q(z) and q¯(z), thus learning
to approximate the density ratio needed for estimating TC
[6]. DTC, parameterized by υ, is trained with the other CF-
VAE components jointly. Thus, the TC term is replaced by
the discriminator-based approximation as follows:
LT = TC(z) ≈ Eq(z)[log D(z)
1−D(z) ] (10)
4.2.3 Onefold CF-VAE Training
The objective of CF-VAE is augmented with a TC [15] term
and LE to encourage independence in the latent factor
distribution, given as follows:
1
N
i=1∑
N
[Eqφ(z|x(i))[logpθ(x
(i)|z)]−DKL(qφ(z|x(i))||p(z))]
−γLT − LE
(11)
This is also a lower bound on the marginal log likelihood
Ep(x)[logp(x)]. The first part reveals the reconstruction error,
denoted by LR, evaluating whether the latent codes z is
informative enough to recover the original instance, e.g.,
l2 loss between the original instance and the reconstructed
instance. The second part is a regularization term, denoted
by LK , to push qφ(z|x) to match the prior distribution p(z).
The third part is the TC term, denoted by LT (Equation 10),
to measure the dependence for multiple random variables.
The last part is the irrelevance term LE (Equation 8).
The parameter φ of encoder qφ(z|x) is then trained by
LK , LE , LR and LT in terms of −∇φ(−LR + LK + γLT +
LE), to let z be unrelated to the label, independent of each
other and close to N(0, I). The parameter ς of the adver-
sarial classifier is updated in terms of −∇ς(LC). The pa-
rameter θ of decoder is updated in terms of −∇θ(LR). The
parameter υ of adversarial classifier is updated in terms of
−∇υ(LT ), i.e.−∇υ 12|B| [
∑
i∈B log(Dυ(z
(i))+
∑
i∈B′ log(1−
Dυ(permutedim(z
′(i)))] [6]. Here, the permutedim function
is to random permutate on a sample in the batch for each
dimension of its z.
64.3 GAN-Based Booster
To address the trade-off between the reconstruction and dis-
entanglement, we apply a GAN-based booster. Specifically,
the GAN discriminator is used to learn a comprehensive
similarity metric to discriminate real images from fake im-
ages. Inspired by [4], [20], the feature-wise metric expressed
in the GAN discriminator, a.k.a. style error or content error
is used as a more abstract reconstruction error LR for VAE to
better measure the similarity between the original instance
and the reconstructed image, aiming to improve the utility
of the reconstructed instance. That is, we can use learned
feature representations in the discriminator of a pre-trained
GAN as the basis for the VAE reconstruction objective.
Specifically, let x and xˆ be the original image and the
reconstructed image and F l(x) and F l(xˆ) be their respective
hidden feature representation of the lth layer of the discrim-
inator, the representation loss to reveal reconstruction error
is defined in Eq. 12 and 13. A Gaussian observation model is
applied for F l(x) with mean F l(xˆ) and identity covariance
p(F l(x)|z) = N(F l(x)|F l(xˆ), I).
LFlrec = −Eq(z|x)[log p(F l(x)|z))] (12)
Lcontentrec (x, xˆ, l) =
1
2
∑
i,j
(F li,j − Fˆ li,j)2 (13)
Simply, a GAN is trained in original clean instances. A
single layer l is then chosen from the discriminator network
and used to obtain representation similarity according to
F l(x). The CF-VAE is then trained based on the represen-
tation error, leveraging the learned feature representations
in the discriminator as the basis for the VAE reconstruction
objective. Note that another variant of GAN, such as info-
GAN [10], can be directly incorporated into our framework.
4.4 Invisible Latent Perturbation by Stochastic Search-
ing
In this section, we introduce an invisible perturbation ap-
proach to manipulate the latent codes zi ∈ z of an instance
x, where E(x) → z. We construct minimum perturba-
tions z∗i = zi + ∆z
∗ to reconstruct adversarial samples
x∗ = D(zˆ = {· · · , z∗i , · · · }) that can fool a classifier into
making wrong predictions over a number of instances with
the common feature controlled by zi.
For simplicity, only one latent code factor is considered
to be perturbed at one time. Let F be a neural network
classifier to be attacked and D be a set of training data
samples for F or similar detests . The perturbation mech-
anism iterative goes through each sample x ∈ D, and
searches for the optimal perturbation in the neighborhood
of zi ∈ E(x) = z, within a searching range [r, r+ ∆r] for zi,
to achieve misclassification and satisfy goals G1-4 in Section
III-B.
At each searching iteration,N perturbations ∆zi are ran-
domly sampled within the current search range for evalua-
tion. Effective Ratio (ER) is used as the indicator to evaluate
the effectiveness of perturbation, defined as follows:
ER =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1F(D(E(x)zi ))6=F(x) (14)
To satisfy G1, misclassifications should be commonly
achieved, i.e. ER exceeds a threshold θER. G2 is satisfied
by the constraint of the searching range ||r + ∆r|| ≤ ,
where the updated perturbation is searched within the Lp
ball of radius r, ∆zi ∼ (r, r + ∆r). To satisfy G3, the
structural similarity (SSIM) [21] between the original input
and the reconstructed instance should exceed a threshold
of θSIM . The search range of perturbation (r, r + ∆r) that
is incrementally raised by ∆r, until G1 to G3 are satisfied
simultaneously. Among ∆z∗i , the one that has the closest
distance to the original zi, is selected to reconstruct x∗ for
xi as the adversarial example.
For the universal perturbation, the iterative searching
is further evaluated in terms of universality on a set of
data samples in the given class y, Dy , namely to evaluate
whether a ∆z∗i from the previous steps satisfies the G4.
Specifically, for each ∆z∗i that satisfies G1-G3 simultane-
ously, its universality will be further evaluated using the
universal indicator, fooling rate (FR), defined as follows:
FR =
1
m
m∑
i=1
1F(D(E(xm)zi ))6=F(xm) (15)
Here, the validation dataset is X∆z∗,zi = {D(E(x1)zi +
∆z∗), · · · , D(E(xm)zi + ∆z∗} modified from a batch of
m samples of Dy . The searching is terminated when the
empirical FR on the X∆z∗,zi exceeds the target threshold
θFR. The detailed algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Invisible Latent Perturbation Algorithm
Input: an instance x, search start value r and upper
bound rmax, , target black-box classifier f ,
specific latent factor zi, pre-trained encoder E and
decoder DE from CF-VAE+GAN-B, threshold
θER, θFR, θSIM .
Output: Universal perturbation ∆z∗
1 S=ø
2 y = f(x), z = E(x), r=0
3 while FR < θFR or r +  < rmax do
4 {∆z} ← sample N random noise within [r, r + ]
5 count =0
6 for ∆ z in {∆z} do
7 z′i = zi + ∆z, xˆ = DE(zˆ), yˆ = f(xˆ)
8 if yˆ 6= y then
9 count ++, S.add(∆z), SIM=similarity(xˆ, x)
10 Xnew ← sample M instances from X
11 FR= 1
M
∑M
i=1 1xˆ 6=y, xi ∈ Xnew
12 ER=count/N
13 if SIM< θSIM or ER< θER then
14 r = r + 
15 else
16 Return ∆z∗ = argmin∆z∈S
4.5 Feature Map-based Semantic Manipulation via mul-
tiple CF-VAE
To achieve semantic manipulation via image-to-image tran-
sition for the manipulation of complex images, two encoders
Es and Et of CF-VAE are applied for mapping images to the
same latent codes, while two decoders Ds and Dt are used
to map latent codes to images in two domains, respectively.
7Given corresponding images pair (xs, xt) from the joint
distribution, then z = Es(xs) = Et(xt) and conversely
xs = Ds(z) and xt = Dt(z). The attribute-conditional
semantic manipulation can be achieved via learning the
function xt = Fs−t(xs) = Dt(Es(xs)) to map from Xs
to Xt. Such shared codes assumption implies the cycle-
consistency assumption [22], i.e. xs = Ft−s(Fs−t(xs)).
These two CF-VAE are implemented based on the shared-
latent space assumption using a weight sharing constraint
[16] and cycle-consistency (CC) [22]. The weight-sharing
constraint is used to relate the two CF-VAEs.
Specifically, the connection weights of the last few layers
in Es and Et are shared to extract high-level representations
of the input images in the two domains. Likewise, the
connection weights of the first few layers in Ds and Dt
are shared to decode high-level representations for recon-
structing the input images. When a pair of corresponding
images can be well mapped to the same latent code and
this same latent code is decoded to a pair of corresponding
images, image-to-image translation occurs, i.e. an image xs
in Xs is translated to an image in Xt. This can be conducted
through applying Dt(zs ∼ qs(zs|xs)). The Xs → Xt and
Xt → Xs can be trained jointly. In addition, we enforce the
CC constraint in this joint training to further regularize the
ill-posed unsupervised image-to-image translation problem.
The learning object is given as follows:
min
Es,t,Ds,t
LV AEs(Es, Ds) + Lccs(Es,t, Ds,t) + LGANs(Et, Ds, DGs)
+LV AEt(Et, Dt) + Lcct(Es,t, Ds,t) + LGANt(Es, Dt, Dist)
(16)
The VAE objects are the same with Equation 11. The GAN
objective functions are given by conditional GAN objective
functions:
LGANs(Et, Ds, Diss) = λgExs∼PXs [logDiss(xs)]
+λgEzt∼qt(zt|xt)[log(1−Diss(Ds(zt)))]
LGANt(Es, Dt, Dist) = λgExt∼PXt [logDist(xt)]
+λgEzs∼qs(zs|xs)[log(1−Dist(Dt(zs)))]
(17)
GAN objective functions are applied to ensure that the
translated images resemble images in the target domains,
respectively, using λg to control the impact of the GAN
objective functions. The CC constraint is modeled via a VAE-
like objective function, similar to [16]. If we jointly train
the GAN with the VAE, this can be conducted by solving
a mini-max problem, as in [4]. Consequently, we can use
Dt(zs ∼ qs(zs|xs)) to translate images from Xs to Xt by
assembling a subset of the subnetworks.
A latent code iterative stochastic searching is then ap-
plied to generate adversarial examples, similar to Algorithm
2 . Note that, as the dimension of the latent codes can be
very large in this scenario, they are stored as a set of feature
map (matrix), e.g., a set of 256 feature matrix with 64 ∗ 64
elements. We treat each matrix as a latent factor, then ∆z
can be selected as the same value for each element of the
matrix and the searching range is a L64∗64 ball of radius r.
4.6 Attack Demonstration
In this section, two types of semantic adversarial examples
are demonstrated, using the vector and feature map based
semantic manipulation, respectively. A synthetic semantic
adversarial example on the handwritten digits of MNIST
[23] is shown in Fig. 3, which is used to demonstrate that
an adversarial digit image can be designed by modifying
only one latent code so that the change looks like something
a person would write in order to fool both a classifier and
human.
Fig. 3. Semantic adversarial examples of MNIST. The figure to the left is
the original digit ”7” instance. Figures in the second part are perturbed
instances that make misclassification (labels in front) by changing only
one specific latent variable (fn). Figures in the third part are the
reconstructed instances, created by changing one latent variable on the
original instance.
Specifically, an adversary trains a CF-VAE on a publicly-
available handwritten digits dataset and applies the en-
coder of the CF-VAE to effectively map instance x to its
corresponding latent bottleneck vector z composed of 20
disentangled latent codes. Then the adversary will choose
some specific latent factor(s) from the latent code vector
z to conduct perturbation, which has been given semantic
meanings. The perturbed latent vector can be reconstructed
to x′ with the help of the decoder. There are 11 disentangled
latent factors selected in Fig. 3 in terms of semantic meaning,
e.g. f7, f9, f13, f16, f17 respectively represent the degree of
horizontal stroke crook, turning angle, thickness, rotation,
and horizontal scale. Due to the disentanglement represen-
tation, each latent factor is exclusively responsible for the
variation of a unique feature in the observed data. The
perturbation on the factor will not significantly change the
perceived quality of the original instance (e.g., it would look
like a natural person’s handwriting) and the reconstructed
x′ should be similar to the original instance yet mislead
classifiers’ decision behavior on the input.
It is easy to perturb each (or a group) latent variable to
conduct the misclassification for the adversary in a human-
cognition way. Taking the digit ”7” in Fig. 3 as an example,
changing the value of latent variable f7 (degree of horizontal
stroke crook) could fool LeNet [24] (test accuracy 99.1%) to
change the label 7 to others. The latent codes that enable
misclassification and retain the perceived quality of the
reconstructed instance will be selected to conduct an attack
in a more practical way, i.e., f4, f7, f10, f13. Furthermore, the
adversary can add the same perturbation to the same latent
factor for other ”7” digits to evaluate the fooling ability and
find a universal perturbation that causes misclassification
generally for all ”7” digits.
We also provide a synthetic semantic adversarial exam-
ple demonstrated on the CelebA [25] database using the
feature map based semantic manipulation, as shown in Fig.
8Fig. 4. Semantic adversarial examples of CelebA. The figure on the left
is the original face instance. Figures in the middle are the instances
reconstructed by conducting linear interpolation with the same pertur-
bation on each latent matrix of the original instance. The figures in the
part on the right are perturbed instances that lead to misclassification
by changing only one specific latent matrix that reveals a specific
semantic features only.
4. The adversary jointly trains two CF-VAEs on the clean
training samples or relevant source dataset (e.g., CelebA)
and target dataset (e.g., only smile face in RaFD or CelebA),
treated as the image-to-image transition. Then the input
face image can be mapped into 256*64*64-dimensions latent
codes, i.e. feature map, using the encoders of these two CF-
VAEs. We find that some 64*64-dimensions matrices can
reveal some disentangled semantic features. For example,
we choose four matrices that respectively represent the
degree of face light, smiling expression, beard and age,
in Fig. 4. The adversary can choose a latent matrix that
only impacts one specific semantic meaning, to conduct
the semantic manipulation-based perturbation. Then the
adversary will find an invisible and efficient perturbation
for each selected latent factor, to cause the targeted classifier
to misclassify the reconstructed instance. For example, the
adversary can add perturbation to the second latent matrix
to only change the smiling degree until the reconstructed
face is misclassified. Furthermore, the adversary can add
the same perturbation to the same latent matrix for other
face images of this person to evaluate the fooling ability and
find a universal perturbation that causes misclassification in
general for this person.
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Datasets
In this section, we present the results from the empirical
evaluations of the proposed approach over two types of
benchmark datasets. (1) MNIST [23] consists of 28 × 28
grayscale handwritten digit images from 10 classes, i.e., digit
0-9 and has a training set of 55000 instances and a test set of
10000 instances. (2) CelebA (cropped version) [25] consists
of 202,599 RGB 64 × 64 × 3 images of various celebrities,
including 10,177 unique identities and 40 binary attribute
annotations per image.
5.2 Metrics
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed
adversarial attack with experimental results on images. We
rely on the following measures.
5.2.1 Success Rate (SR)
SR aims to measure the fraction of perturbed samples drawn
from the test set being classified as the target class in the
case of a targeted attack, changing to other arbitrary target
class in the case of non-targeted attacks. A high SR shows
an effective ability of the adversarial example to fool the
classifier. SR is used to evaluate the vulnerability of trained
classifiers to our semantic adversarial attack.
5.2.2 Perturbation Stealthiness
The stealthiness of perturbation represents the quality of the
perturbation to generate an adversarial example. Although
the perturbed samples with perturbation are likely visually
imperceptible, it is preferable for the perturbation to be also
imperceptible in latent space and evade input-preprocessing
defenses. Therefore, three quantitative measurements are
implemented to evaluate the stealthiness of semantic ad-
versarial example via perturbation. (1) Perceptual Hash-
ing (pHash) Similarity: pHash [26] is used to present the
fingerprint of an image based on its features. The pHash
can measure the overall feature representation, instead of
measuring the abrupt pixel change of an image. Images with
similar features have similar pHash value. We can use the
following equation to determine the similarity between the
original image and the perturbed image and estimate how
much the original image has been changed.
Simage = (1− HD(pHashori, pHashpoi)
64
)× 100% (18)
where HD is the Hamming Distance, and 64 represent the
binary length of the pHash score.
(2) Structural Dissimilarity (SSIM). This is used to mea-
sure the internal feature similarity as a distance matrix
evaluating the structural similarity of images [21]. It is
closer to the human sensitivities compared to Lp distance.
Therefore, using SSIM to evaluate the difference between
two images satisfies human criterion more about negligible
perturbation. It evaluates the difference between two input
images similar to human’s criterion which is suit for the two
image recognition applications in our experiments.
(3) Distance in the latent space (DLS). The difference
in the input x representation between the instance and its
corresponding adversarial example, e.g., RMSE of the pixels,
is not enough to quantify the semantic distance underlying
them. Therefore, we use the distance in the latent space
between them, i.e., ∆z = ||z∗ − z′||, to evaluate how much
each instance is changed to achieve misclassification.
(4) The mean-squared error (MSE) between two images
is used as the pixel-wise similarity measure.
5.3 Setup
We evaluated our attack when two strong defenses are
present. One feasible defense against our attack is to train
the same autoencoder using relevant data and then find
the normal value range for each disentangled feature factor.
The adversary and protector are considered two parties of a
game. The common parameter for defending and attacking
in this game is the threshold to decide the normal value.
The varying threshold of distance in the latent space (DLS)
is used to reveal different levels of distinguishability of
9defenses. Another defense is the input-based de-noising by
a threshold of the pixel-wise reconstruction error. Therefore,
we use the mean-squared error (MSE) between original
and reconstructed instance to reveal the robustness of our
attack against such defenses; the varying threshold of MSE
represents different levels of distinguishability of defenses.
This can be considered as a general input-based defense,
e.g., Magnet.
An existing similar adversarial attack on latent space is
[3], in which the latent vector is not perturbed in an in-
terpretable manner and without controllable mapping from
latent space to pixel space. We simplify this type of attack as
a general latent perturbation in our experiments, in which
the latent vector is perturbed randomly. We compare our
semantic attack with this general latent attack to demon-
strate the controllability and feasibility of our attack. We
also demonstrate the stealthiness (semantic similarity) of the
perturbed instance for our attack, compared with general
latent-based attacks.
We use a Convolutional Neural Network for the encoder,
a Deconvolutional Neural Network for the decoder and
a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) for the discriminator and
classifier in CF-VAE for experiments on all data sets. We use
[0,1] normalised data as targets for the mean of a Bernoulli
distribution, using negative cross-entropy for log p(x|z)
and Adam optimiser with learning rate 10−4, β1 = 0.9;
β2 = 0.999 for the VAE updates, as in [5]. We also use Adam
for the discriminator updates with β1 = 0.5; β2 = 0.9 and
a learning rate tuned from {10−4, 10−5}. We use 10−4 for
MNIST, and 10−5 for CelebA. The encoder outputs param-
eters for the mean and log-variance of Gaussian q(z|x), and
the decoder outputs logits for each entry of the image. We
use the same six layer MLP discriminator with 1000 hidden
units per layer and leaky ReLU (lReLU) nonlinearity, that
outputs two logits in all CF-VAE experiments, as in [6]. We
train for 3 × 105 iterations on MNIST and 106 iterations on
CelebA. We use a batch size of 200 for all data sets. The
default hurdle values to recognize satisfactory adversarial
example are [θFR = 0.2, θSSIM = 52, θER = 0.1,  = 0.1].
5.4 Evaluations
In this section, we present and explain the high vulnerability
of DNN classifiers to our semantic adversarial attack under
various settings and demonstrate the perturbation stealthi-
ness and universality as well.
5.4.1 Evaluation Vulnerability to Adversarial Attack Under
Various Settings
To demonstrate performance of our semantic adversarial
attack, we first compare such attack with other types of
attacks, namely latent (perturbation is conducted generally
into latent representations derived from autoencoder or in-
verter, e.g., natural adversarial example [3]), semantic (per-
turbation is conducted into disentangled latent representa-
tions derived from CF-VAE) and boosted semantic (pertur-
bation is conducted into disentangled latent representations
derived from CF-VAE+GAN-B) settings respectively.
Attack Performance and Robustness. We apply our ad-
versarial attack to some state-of-the-art black-box classifiers
for images, i.e. two-layer LeNet [27] convolutional neural
network classifier for MNIST (with 99.1% accuracy), 50-
layer ResNet [28] classifier for CelebA face ( 81.3% accuracy
for identification classifier).
For each perturbation procedure and its corresponding
setting, we evaluate the adversarial attack with each se-
lected class. The attack SR on the test set is calculated for
each class.
Effect of Parameters. In this section, we evaluate the
effect of changing hyperparameters of the scheme on the
results of images. Three scenarios are evaluated, e.g., the SR
performance for ordinary latent (legend latent), general SR
performance for semantic (legend semantic, in this case, we
define a successful adversarial example when misclassifica-
tion is achieved by perturbing any latent factor), and factor-
specific SR performance for semantic (legend factor-n, in
this case, we define a successful adversarial example when
misclassification is achieved by only perturbing a specific
latent factor). An adversarial example candidate is decided
as a satisfactory (or successful) adversarial example when
the perturbation added to the latent factor(s) within a value
range can achieve misclassification, while the efficient ratio
ER and its structural similarity SSIM (or other similarity
evaluation) are both more than thresholds θER and θSIM
respectively.
Therefore, we evaluate the SR change when varying the
hurdle for ER and similarity evaluations (e.g., structural
similarity SSIM, distance in latent space DLS and pHash
similarity hurdles) respectively. We also investigate how
the perturbation value range distribution over satisfactory
adversarial examples in terms of the SR.
As shown in the first subfigure of Fig. 5, the attack SR
generally decreases when we increase the hurdle of ER
to decide an adversarial example. In comparison, we can
achieve a generally more decent attack performance with a
high SR (more than 80% for factor-specific evaluation even
100% for general evaluation when ER hurdle is set as 10%)
compared with an ordinary latent attack (0% SR when ER
hurdle is set as 10%) as ER hurdle increases. Note that the
SR will tend to be 0% when the hurdle of ER is set more than
a relatively large value (50% for the semantic latent attack
while 5% for ordinary latent attack).
The second to fourth subfigures of Fig. 5 describes the
impacts of the similarity hurdle on the SR change. Generally,
a great SSIM similarity or a small pHash and DLS similarity
values reveal a good quality of the adversarial examples.
When we raise the hurdle of SSIM evaluation or reduce the
hurdle of pHash and DLS evaluations to decide an adver-
sarial example, the attack SR generally declines. Namely,
when we improve the desired quality criteria of adversarial
examples, the number of satisfactory adversarial examples
will decrease (it is harder to find satisfactory adversarial
examples). Again, our attack can achieve an overall better
attack performance as the criterion of similarity for satis-
factory adversarial examples increases, compared with the
ordinary latent attack.
We also demonstrate the impact of choosing various
perturbation value ranges on the SR, namely how the per-
turbations of adversarial examples distribute over satisfac-
tory adversarial examples. In order to conduct the semantic
adversarial attack, an array of perturbations is added to
various latent factors by varying the value range of fac-
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tors exponentially from -10 to 10. As shown in the last
subfigure of Fig. 5, most adversarial examples candidates
are defined as satisfactory adversarial examples using the
perturbation within a small perturbation range value for
ordinary latent attacks, while the perturbation values that
achieve satisfactory semantic adversarial examples are more
evenly distributed. The reason is that the goal of ordinary
latent attacks is to find the minimum perturbations that can
cause misclassification only, no matter how the adversarial
example differs from the original one in terms of some simi-
larity metrics. However, our semantic attack aims to find ap-
propriate perturbations that can cause misclassification via
controlling specific feature(s), in which many determinants
can affect the value range locating, e.g., the stealthiness
in both the latent and input space. On the other hand,
such range value distribution figures can provide a precise
”handbook” for adversarial to design effective perturbation
of adversarial attack, which can be experimentally obtained
using a similar dataset as the targeted data.
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Fig. 5. Success rate evaluation. The first two rows reveal the SR change
when varying hurdle of efficient ratio ER, similarity evaluation metric,
e.g., structural similarity SSIM, pHash similarity and distance in latent
space similarity. The last figure demonstrates the success rate achieved
on various perturbation range value.
Effect of Selected Latent Factors. Next, we will demon-
strate the impact of selected latent factors on the SR in the
following parts in detail. We evaluate the SR change when
varying the hurdle for ER and similarity evaluations (e.g.,
structural similarity SSIM, distance in latent space DLS and
pHash similarity hurdles) respectively, perturbing only one
latent factor for each attack round. We also investigate how
the perturbations of adversarial examples distribute over
satisfactory adversarial examples when varying the latent
factor to be perturbed.
As shown in Fig. 6, when we change the hurdle of ER,
SSIM similarity, pHash, and DLS similarity values to decide
an adversarial example, all factors have the same change
tendency of attack SR. However, these detailed amplitudes
of variation are different. Various factors show better per-
formances in terms of SR at different hurdle criteria as well
as different hurdle value ranges. Consequently, based on
the experimental analysis in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, the attacker
can choose one appropriate factor to conduct the attack and
choose the efficient value range for the selected features
in terms of attack SR. We demonstrated the robustness of
our attack against strong defenses in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
The varying threshold of distance in the latent space (DLS)
is used to reveal different levels of distinguishability of
defenses.
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Fig. 6. Success rate evaluation when perturbing different latent factor.
The first two rows reveal the success rate change when varying hurdle
of efficient ratio ER, similarity evaluation metric, e.g., structural similarity
SSIM, pHash similarity and distance in latent space similarity. The last
figure demonstrates the success rate achieved on various perturbation
range value.
5.4.2 Evaluation of Perturbation Stealthiness
We compare input, ordinary, semantic and boosted per-
turbation generated for the five class instances. For each
class, we select 100 images from class c in the testing set
to implement these four perturbation mechanisms, then the
average pHash, SSIM, MSE, and DLS similarity metrics are
measured respectively. pHash and MSE are used to evaluate
the pixel-wise similarity, DLS measures the latent similarity
and SSIM estimates the similarity from the view of human
cognition. The results averaged among these metrics are
summarized in Table I.
We can see that semantic has higher SSIM similarity
scores while smaller pHash, MSE and DLS based dissimi-
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TABLE 1
Evaluation of Perturbation Stealthiness
Stealthiness latent semantic boosted
MNIST
pHash 9.42 9.14 7.82
MSE 0.03 0.02 0.01
SSIM 77.20 81.85 84.32
DLS 7.01 2.23 1.16
CelebA
pHash 39.53 18.41 16.21
MSE 0.06 0.05 0.04
SSIM 17.45 30.86 32.34
DLS 8.32 5.97 5.24
larity scores (e.g., 81.5%, 9.14, 0.02 and 2.23 over MNIST),
compared with the original latent attack (e.g., 77.2%, 9.42,
0.03 and 7.01 over MNIST). The results reveal that our
attack can generate adversarial examples with better qual-
ity in both input space and latent space to fool a time-
limited human: the stealthiness of the perturbation is better
ensured by our attack. We also find that the image with
a boosted strategy has a higher SSIM and smaller pHash,
MSE and DLS dissimilarity values than that of the semantic
perturbation. This shows that the GAN-B improves the
reconstruction quality in both input space and latent space.
Namely, GAN-B can further enhance the perturbation of our
attack.
Similarly, the evaluations on the CelebA face data con-
firm these results again. We can see that semantic has
higher SSIM similarity scores while smaller pHash, MSE
and DLS based dissimilarity scores (e.g., 30.86%, 8.14, 0.05
and 18.41 over CelebA), compared with the original latent
attack (e.g., 17.45%, 8.32, 0.06 and 39.53 over CelebA).
The image with the boosted strategy has a higher SSIM
and smaller pHash, MSE and DLS dissimilarity values than
that of the semantic perturbation. Note that the similarity
scores for face data are worse than hand-written digits.
The reason is that the latent features of the face are more
complete than digits, which requires more well-labeled data
and deeper neural networks to obtain better disentangled
and reconstruction performance.
Fig. 7. Demonstration of stealthiness for our attack over MNIST. An
ordinary latent attack is demonstrated in the yellow box (left is the clean
instance and right is the perturbed instance that causes misclassifica-
tion). A semantic attack is demonstrated in the red box (left is the clean
instance, middle is a perturbed instance using semantic attack and right
is the perturbed instance using boosted semantic attack).
In addition, we also demonstrate the stealthiness of
our attack. In Fig. 7, we compare the reversed instance
from the perturbed latent variables for both ordinary latent
attack and our semantic attack, taking produced adversarial
examples for a single digit ”7” as an example. The reversed
instance by the ordinary latent attack is shown in the yellow
box. We can see that such an attack might lead to misclas-
sification by adding random noise into the latent variables,
however, cannot control what the reversed instance looks
like. In comparison, our semantic attack causes misclassi-
fication by perturbing a latent factor that only affects one
feature, thereby controlling what the reversed instance looks
like. As demonstrated in the red box, the perturbed instance
using the semantic attack can achieve misclassification by
only perturbing the latent factor that affects the stroke of the
digit, while the quality of the reversed instance is further
enhanced by using the boosted strategy. We compare our
semantic attack with this general latent attack in Fig. 5,
8, 10 and Table I, II to demonstrate the controllability and
feasibility of our attack.
5.4.3 Evaluation of Universal Perturbation
If we find a misclassification perturbation for an instance
by adding noise to a specific latent factor, for example
perturbing the factor that affects the stroke of digit ”7”, it is
natural to consider whether the same perturbation, added
to perturb the same latent factor of a different digit ”7”
instance, could give rise to misclassification. Therefore, in
this section, we investigate whether we can demonstrate the
universality of our semantic adversarial examples on the
instances with the same class type.
The goal is to evaluate whether the same perturbation on
the same selected latent factor, leading to misclassification
for a given classifier over a specific input x, can cause other
instances from the same class with x to be misclassified and
how many and how to be impacted by hurdle parameters.
Specifically, we evaluate the universality of perturbation
against two-layer LeNet classifiers on MNIST in terms of
fooling rate FR. We select five class instances to obtain
misclassification perturbation by only perturbating one la-
tent factor fi, which is composed of 500 images from the
training set, i.e., on average 100 images per class, named
construction set. The universal perturbation for each class
on fi is the average misclassification perturbation on all 100
instances with the same class, named testing set. For each
universal perturbation for fi, we test the fooling rate over a
validation set that consists of randomly selected 100 images
with the same class type. Four latent factors are selected to
be evaluated using the approach in Algorithm 1.
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81
F
R
Proportion
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
S
R
FR
latent
semantic
factor-3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
S
R
FR
factor-1 factor-2
factor-3 factor-4
factor-5 factor9
factor-16 factor-17
Fig. 8. Fooling rate evaluation on MNIST. The success rate SR repre-
sents the proportion of adversarial example with corresponding fooling
power in terms of the fooling rate at x axis.
The first subfigure of Fig. 8 shows the fooling rates
obtained on the validation set when varying the proportion
of the construction set to generate universal perturbation.
The fooling rate increases as the size of the proportion goes
up and then tends to be stable. An interesting result is
that by using an arbitrary instance of the construction set
to generate universal perturbation based on our semantic
attack, we can fool approximately 30% of the images on the
validation set.
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Next, we use the one-instance-based universal pertur-
bation to evaluate the fooling rate, to reveal the fooling
power of the instance in the construction set. The last two
subfigures of Fig. 8 reveal the distribution of adversarial
examples in terms of fooling rate. Overall, the universal
perturbation derived from any one instance of the construc-
tion set achieves very considerable fooling rates (10− 20%)
on the validation set using our semantic latent attack. For
example, more than 70% of one-instance-based universal
perturbation derived from our attack scheme can fool 20%
of clean images in the validation set. The fooling power of
universal perturbation, derived from any one instance of the
construction set using an ordinary latent attack, is generally
below 10% (more than 80% one-instance-based universal
perturbation). Consequently, these demonstrations reveal
that our attack has remarkable universal perturbation power
over unseen data points, which can be computed on a small
set of training instances, even arbitrary one instance.
We further investigate the performance of the one-
instance-based universal perturbation in terms of the fooling
rate when varying parameter settings. As shown in the first
graph in Fig. 9, we evaluate the fooling rate change when
varying the hurdle for ER and similarity evaluations (e.g.,
structural similarity SSIM and distance in latent space DLS
hurdles) respectively when figuring out perturbation over
the instances in the construction set using our semantic
attack. As we change the hurdle of ER, SSIM similarity and
DLS similarity criteria to decide an adversarial example,
the fooling rate represents different trends of change. As
we increase the hurdle of efficient ratio ER, the fooling
rate vibrates a lot. However, it is feasible to choose an
appropriate ER hurdle that can achieve a better fooling rate.
When we raise the requirement for the similarity criteria
of the adversarial examples, the fooling rate will decline.
We also evaluate the impact of the selected latent factor on
the fooling rate when varying parameters. Various factors
show good performances in terms of fooling rate at different
hurdle criteria.
0.185
0.186
0.187
0.188
0.189
0.19
0.191
0.192
0.193
0.194
0.195
0.05 0.25 0.45 0.65 0.85
F
R
ER
semantic
0.167
0.168
0.169
0.17
0.171
0.172
0.173
0.174
0.175
56 66 76 86 96
F
R
SSIM
semantic
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
F
R
DLS
semantic
0.0494
0.0496
0.0498
0.05
0.0502
0.0504
0.0506
0.0508
0.051
0.0512
0.0514
0.05 0.25 0.45 0.65 0.85
F
R
ER
natural
0.0378
0.0379
0.038
0.0381
0.0382
0.0383
0.0384
0.0385
0.0386
0.0387
0.0388
56 66 76 86 96
F
R
SSIM
natural
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
F
R
DLS
natural
Fig. 9. Fooling rate evaluation on MNIST with varying hurdle criteria to
generate adversarial examples.
We also investigate the stealthiness of the adversarial
examples generated using the one-instance-based universal
perturbation. The stealthiness of the results is shown in
Table II.
We can see that the perturbed instances using the per-
turbation derived from our semantic latent attack have
higher SSIM similarity scores while smaller pHash, MSE,
and DLS based dissimilarity scores, compared with using
the ordinary latent attack. The results reveal that the uni-
TABLE 2
Evaluation of Stealthiness for Universal Perturbation
Stealthiness Latent Semantic Boosted
MNIST
pHash 19.37 12.92 10.82
MSE 0.23 0.03 0.01
SSIM 3.81 77.14 88.32
DLS 7.01 0.015 0.016
versal perturbation using our attack can generate better
quality adversarial examples in both input space and latent
space to even fool a human. Namely, the stealthiness of the
universal perturbation is better ensured by our attack. We
also find that the image with boosted strategy can improve
the reconstruction quality in both input space and latent
space.
Fig. 10. Visual demonstration of stealthiness for universal perturbation.
Left subfigure is the misclassified image after adding universal pertur-
bation into a latent factor that affects angles using a semantic attack,
and the right subfigure is the misclassified image after adding universal
perturbation into the latent vector using the ordinary latent attack.
Fig. 10 shows a visual demonstration of the perturbed
images to further demonstrate the stealthiness of the univer-
sal perturbation. Compared with the universal perturbation
for ordinary latent perturbation, the universal perturbation
discovered using our semantic attack is more imperceptible
and stealthy. We also find that such universal perturbations
are not unique, as many different efficient universal per-
turbations can be generated for the same value range on a
given latent factor.
These experimental results show the existence of single
universal perturbation, in terms of a specific latent factor,
that causes clean images to be misclassified with high
probability for one class of the instance. Such universal
perturbations are also stealthy in both the latent and input
space.
6 RELATED WORK
Since the discovery of adversarial examples for neural net-
works [8], researchers have found adversarial examples on
various network architectures; for example, feedforward
convolutional classification networks [29], generative net-
works [30], and recurrent networks [31]. Researchers devel-
oped several methods for generating adversarial examples,
most of which leveraged gradient-based optimization from
normal examples [8], [29]. Moosavi et al. showed that it
was even possible to find one effective universal adversarial
perturbation that, when applied, turned many images ad-
versarial [32]. To simplify the discussion, we only focus on
attacks targeting neural network classifiers.
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6.0.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
Given a normal image x, the fast gradient sign method [33]
looks for a similar image x’ in the L∞ neighborhood of x
that fools the classifier. It denies a loss function Loss(x, l)
that describes the cost of classifying x as label l . Then, it
transforms the problem to maximizing Loss(x′, lx) which is
the cost of classifying image x′ as its ground truth label lx
while keeping the perturbation small. The FGSM solves this
optimization problem by performing a one-step gradient
update from x in the image space with volume . The update
step-width  is identical for each pixel, and the update
direction is determined by the sign of gradient at this pixel.
Formally, the adversarial example x′ is calculated as:
x′ = x+ × sign(OxLoss(x, lx)) (19)
Although this attack is simple, it is fast and can be quite
powerful. Normally,  is set to be small. Increasing  usually
leads to the higher attack SR.
6.0.2 Iterative Gradient Sign Method
Kurakin [34] proposed to improve FGSM by using a finer
iterative optimization strategy. For each iteration, the attack
performs FGSM with a smaller step-width α, and clips
the updated result so that the updated image stays in the
 neighborhood of x. Such iteration is then repeated for
several times. For the ith iteration, the update process is:
x′i+1 = clip,x(x
′
i + α× sign(OxLoss(x, lx))) (20)
This updated strategy can be used for both L1 and L2
metrics and greatly improves the SR of FGSM attack.
6.0.3 DeepFool
DeepFool is also an iterative attack but formalizes the prob-
lem differently [35]. The basic idea is to find the closest de-
cision boundary from a normal image x in the image space,
and then to cross that boundary to fool the classifier. It is
hard to solve this problem directly in the high-dimensional
and highly non-linear space in neural networks. So instead,
it iteratively solves this problem with a linearized approx-
imation. More specifically, for each iteration, it linearizes
the classifier around the intermediate x′ and derives an
optimal update direction on this linearized model. It then
updates x′ towards this direction by a small step α. By
repeating the linearize-update process until x′ crosses the
decision boundary, the attack finds an adversarial example
with small perturbation.
6.0.4 Carlini Attack
Carlini recently introduced a powerful attack that gener-
ates adversarial examples with small perturbation [29]. The
attack can be targeted or untargeted for all three metrics
L0, L2, and L∞. We take the untargeted L2 version as an
example here to introduce its main idea. We may formalize
the attack as the following optimization problem:
minimize
δ
‖δ‖2 + c× f(x+ δ) s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n (21)
For a fixed input image x, the attack looks for a pertur-
bation δ that is small in length and fools the classifier (the f
() term in objective) at the same time. c is a hyperparameter
that balances the two. Also, the optimization has to satisfy
the box constraints to be a valid image. f () is designed in
such a way that f(x′) ≤ 0 if and only if the classifier classi-
fies x′ incorrectly, which indicates that the attack succeeds.
f(x′) has hinge loss form and is defined as
f(x′) = max(Z(x′)lx −max{Z(x′)i : i 6= lx},−κ) (22)
where Z(x′) is the pre-softmax classification result vector
(called logits) and x is the ground truth label. κ is a
hyper-parameter called confidence. Higher confidence en-
courages the attack to search for adversarial examples that
are stronger in classification confidence. High-confidence
attacks often have larger perturbations and better transfer-
ability.
One strong defense is to detect or purify input data that
may have added adversarial perturbation with hand-crafted
statistical features [36], separate classification networks [37]
or detector-based denoising [38]. MagNet [38], one or more
separate detector networks and a reformer network are used
to defend adversarial examples. The detector networks learn
to differentiate between normal and adversarial examples
by approximating the manifold of normal examples. The
reformer network passes input data to the autoencoders that
move input data closer to the data manifold.
To address the unnatural perturbations added into the
input space, [3] applies GAN to generate natural and legible
adversarial examples that lie on the data manifold, by
searching in semantic space of dense and continuous data
representation. It aims to solve the mismatch between the
input space perturbation and the semantic space features.
However, the perturbations in the latent space are hard
to control due to the lack of interpretability and factoriza-
tion/disentanglement.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
introduces a systematic framework to generate semantic
adversarial examples that are designed by perturbing the
disentangled latent variables in an interpretable, practical
and stealthy manner.
7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we propose a practical semantic adversarial
attack scheme to produce adversarial examples that can be
designed in a human-cognition manner with structured per-
turbations with semantic meanings. We implement such an
attack against black-box classifiers for images. Specifically,
we propose onefold and multiple semantic feature manip-
ulation approaches, respectively. For the onefold scenario,
we propose the CF-VAE to obtain disentangled latent repre-
sentation that can easily be manipulated in an interpretable
manner. The disentanglement performance is improved
from two aspects: driving the label relevant information
from latent factors and improving the inner independence
of latent factors. In addition, a GAN-B is applied to use the
representation similarity derived from the discriminator of
GAN to evaluate the reconstruction error so that it addresses
the trade-offs between reconstruction and disentanglement.
An invisible perturbation mechanism is proposed to find the
most efficient latent factors to conduct the perturbation that
causes misclassification while ensuring the stealthiness. For
multiple scenarios, we apply an image-to-image transition
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to jointly train two CF-VAE that can produce more precise
constraints on the reconstructed images using natural target
images.
Our detailed experiments demonstrate that our attack
schemes are both stealthy and efficient to generate adversar-
ial examples in an interpretable and smooth manner while
ensuring the stealthiness of malicious perturbation in both
a visual perspective and latent space. We also demonstrate
that universal semantic adversarial examples exist in a sig-
nificant number of samples with the same labels. As the
learned latent feature vector is disentangled, we provide
a perturbation design handbook for adversarial attacks to
show which factor affects which feature and how much.
Thus, two or more latent factors will affect corresponding
factorized features, respectively. The quality of the recon-
structed image is not significantly affected by how many
features are changed but how much perturbation is applied
to individual features. After obtaining the perturbation de-
sign handbook, our attack can decide the perturbation for
infinite instances in one-shot (constant time). Most existing
adversarial attacks design perturbation for each instance
one by one. Therefore, our attack is highly efficient by
construction and experiments for a time-based comparison
are not necessary.
A potential refinement of our work includes designing
universal perturbation for multiple classifiers and targeted
misclassification and further addressing the disentangle-
ment and reconstruction trade-off. We also aim to inves-
tigate applying variants of the semantic attack to other
domains besides image classification, e.g., time-series data
and text data. In addition, we will continue to improve
the disentanglement performance and explore class-unique
features.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami, “The limitations of deep learning in adversarial
settings,” in Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2016 IEEE European
Symposium on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 372–387.
[2] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song, “Delving into transfer-
able adversarial examples and black-box attacks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1611.02770, 2016.
[3] Z. Zhao, D. Dua, and S. Singh, “Generating natural adversarial
examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.11342, 2017.
[4] A. B. L. Larsen, S. K. Sønderby, H. Larochelle, and O. Winther,
“Autoencoding beyond pixels using a learned similarity metric,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.09300, 2015.
[5] I. Higgins, L. Matthey, A. Pal, C. Burgess, X. Glorot, M. Botvinick,
S. Mohamed, and A. Lerchner, “beta-vae: Learning basic visual
concepts with a constrained variational framework,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations, vol. 3, 2017.
[6] H. Kim and A. Mnih, “Disentangling by factorising,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.05983, 2018.
[7] Y. Bengio, A. Courville, and P. Vincent, “Representation learning:
A review and new perspectives,” IEEE transactions on pattern
analysis and machine intelligence, vol. 35, no. 8, pp. 1798–1828, 2013.
[8] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Good-
fellow, and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[9] B. Biggio, I. Corona, D. Maiorca, B. Nelson, N. Sˇrndic´, P. Laskov,
G. Giacinto, and F. Roli, “Evasion attacks against machine learning
at test time,” in Joint European conference on machine learning and
knowledge discovery in databases. Springer, 2013, pp. 387–402.
[10] X. Chen, Y. Duan, R. Houthooft, J. Schulman, I. Sutskever, and
P. Abbeel, “Infogan: Interpretable representation learning by in-
formation maximizing generative adversarial nets,” in Advances in
neural information processing systems, 2016, pp. 2172–2180.
[11] J. Donahue, P. Kra¨henbu¨hl, and T. Darrell, “Adversarial feature
learning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.09782, 2016.
[12] A. Kumar, P. Sattigeri, and P. T. Fletcher, “Improved semi-
supervised learning with gans using manifold invariances,” Ad-
vances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), 2017.
[13] C. Ledig, L. Theis, F. Husza´r, J. Caballero, A. Cunningham,
A. Acosta, A. Aitken, A. Tejani, J. Totz, Z. Wang et al., “Photo-
realistic single image super-resolution using a generative adver-
sarial network,” in 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition (CVPR). IEEE, 2017, pp. 105–114.
[14] S. Reed, Z. Akata, X. Yan, L. Logeswaran, B. Schiele, and H. Lee,
“Generative adversarial text to image synthesis,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1605.05396, 2016.
[15] S. Watanabe, “Information theoretical analysis of multivariate
correlation,” IBM Journal of research and development, vol. 4, no. 1,
pp. 66–82, 1960.
[16] M.-Y. Liu, T. Breuel, and J. Kautz, “Unsupervised image-to-image
translation networks,” in Advances in neural information processing
systems, 2017, pp. 700–708.
[17] X. Huang, M.-Y. Liu, S. Belongie, and J. Kautz, “Multimodal
unsupervised image-to-image translation,” in Proceedings of the
European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV), 2018, pp. 172–189.
[18] Z. Liu, P. Luo, X. Wang, and X. Tang, “Deep learning face attributes
in the wild,” in Proceedings of International Conference on Computer
Vision (ICCV), December 2015.
[19] A. Makhzani, J. Shlens, N. Jaitly, I. Goodfellow, and B. Frey,
“Adversarial autoencoders,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05644, 2015.
[20] L. A. Gatys, A. S. Ecker, and M. Bethge, “A neural algorithm of
artistic style,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.06576, 2015.
[21] Z. Wang, E. P. Simoncelli, and A. C. Bovik, “Multiscale structural
similarity for image quality assessment,” in The Thrity-Seventh
Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems Computers, 2003, vol. 2, 2003,
pp. 1398–1402 Vol.2.
[22] J.-Y. Zhu, T. Park, P. Isola, and A. A. Efros, “Unpaired image-to-
image translation using cycle-consistent adversarial networks,” in
Proceedings of the IEEE international conference on computer vision,
2017, pp. 2223–2232.
[23] Y. LeCun, C. Cortes, and C. Burges, “Mnist handwritten
digit database,” ATT Labs [Online]. Available: http://yann. lecun.
com/exdb/mnist, vol. 2, 2010.
[24] Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, P. Haffner et al., “Gradient-based
learning applied to document recognition,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 86, no. 11, pp. 2278–2324, 1998.
[25] Z. Liu, P. Luo, X. Wang, and X. Tang, “Deep learning face attributes
in the wild,” in Proceedings of the IEEE international conference on
computer vision, 2015, pp. 3730–3738.
[26] C. Liao, H. Zhong, A. Squicciarini, S. Zhu, and D. Miller, “Back-
door embedding in convolutional neural network models via
invisible perturbation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.10307, 2018.
[27] Y. LeCun, P. Haffner, L. Bottou, and Y. Bengio, “Object recognition
with gradient-based learning,” in Shape, contour and grouping in
computer vision. Springer, 1999, pp. 319–345.
[28] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for
image recognition,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition, 2016, pp. 770–778.
[29] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Towards evaluating the robustness of
neural networks,” in 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP). IEEE, 2017, pp. 39–57.
[30] J. Kos, I. Fischer, and D. Song, “Adversarial examples for genera-
tive models,” in 2018 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW).
IEEE, 2018, pp. 36–42.
[31] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, A. Swami, and R. Harang, “Craft-
ing adversarial input sequences for recurrent neural networks,”
in Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2016-2016 IEEE.
IEEE, 2016, pp. 49–54.
[32] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and P. Frossard,
“Universal adversarial perturbations,” in 2017 IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR). Ieee, 2017, pp.
86–94.
[33] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining
and harnessing adversarial examples (2014),” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572.
[34] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial examples
in the physical world,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[35] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Deepfool: a
simple and accurate method to fool deep neural networks,” in
15
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, 2016, pp. 2574–2582.
[36] K. Grosse, P. Manoharan, N. Papernot, M. Backes, and P. Mc-
Daniel, “On the (statistical) detection of adversarial examples,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06280, 2017.
[37] J. H. Metzen, T. Genewein, V. Fischer, and B. Bischoff, “On de-
tecting adversarial perturbations,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.04267,
2017.
[38] D. Meng and H. Chen, “Magnet: a two-pronged defense against
adversarial examples,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2017,
pp. 135–147.
